DePaul Journal of Art, Technology
& Intellectual Property Law
Volume 6
Issue 1 Fall 1995

Article 8

Law v. National Collegiate Athletic Association, 1995 WL 530123
(D. Kan. Aug. 2, 1995)
Terry Schiff

Follow this and additional works at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip

Recommended Citation
Terry Schiff, Law v. National Collegiate Athletic Association, 1995 WL 530123 (D. Kan. Aug. 2, 1995), 6
DePaul J. Art, Tech. & Intell. Prop. L. 109 (1995)
Available at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol6/iss1/8

This Sports Law Article is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law at Via Sapientiae. It has
been accepted for inclusion in DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law by an authorized
editor of Via Sapientiae. For more information, please contact digitalservices@depaul.edu.

Schiff: Law v. National Collegiate Athletic Association, 1995 WL 530123 (

Law v. National Collegiate Athletic Association,
1995 WL 530123 (D. KAN. AUG. 2, 1995).
INTRODUCTION

In January of 1991, the Division I members of the National Collegiate Athletic Association voted to adopt Bylaw 11.02.3. The Bylaw, known as the "Restricted Earnings Coach Rule," limited the number of coaches in all Division I sports
and required institutions to designate one of their coaches in every sport other
than football a "restricted earnings coach."' Plaintiffs, who are or were employed as restricted earnings coaches at Division I institutions, alleged that the
Division I members of the National Collegiate Athletic Association had conspired to limit the maximum compensation they will pay to one category of
basketball coaches, the "restricted earnings coaches," thereby creating an impermissible restraint of trade in violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act.2 The United
States District Court for the District of Kansas granted summary judgment to the
plaintiffs based on the "quick look" rule of reason.
FACTS
The National Collegiate Athletic Association ("NCAA") is an association of
over 800 colleges and universities engaged in intercollegiate athletic competition.
The NCAA is divided into Division I, Division II, and Division III schools.
Division I programs are generally of a higher stature and have more visibility
than Division I and III programs. Each Division I member of the NCAA hires
and employs its own basketball coaches.
In 1989, the NCAA established a Cost Reduction Committee ("CRC"),
charged with the task of formulating recommendations to NCAA members for
reducing costs in intercollegiate athletics without compromising the competitive
balance of the NCAA. At the time, many NCAA member institutions perceived
difficulties in meeting costs associated with the maintenance of athletic programs. In fact, the NCAA formed the CRC in response to what some viewed as
a catastrophic cost spiral which, if not controlled, would eventually cause the
complete demise of intercollegiate athletics. The CRC identified personnel as the
largest expense in intercollegiate athletic programs and determined that costs
could be reduced by curtailing football and basketball staffs and by limiting
personnel in other sports as well.
Based on these findings, the CRC proposed legislation which would limit the
number of coaches in all Division I sports and would require institutions to designate one of their coaches in every sport other than football a "restricted earn-

1. Law v. National Collegiate Athletic Association, 1995 WL 530123 (D. Kan. Aug. 2, 1995).
2. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1973).
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ings coach." The "Restricted Earnings Coach Rule" required that restricted earnings coaches' compensation be limited to $12,000 during the academic year and
$4,000 during the summer months.' These salaries were roughly equivalent to
the salaries previously paid to graduate assistant coaches. However, restricted
earnings coaches could receive additional compensation for performing duties for
another department of the institution during either the summer or the academic
year, provided that (1) such compensation was commensurate with that received
by others performing the same or similar assignments, (2) the ratio of compensation received for coaching duties and any other duties was directly proportionate
to the amount of time devoted to the two areas of assignment, and (3) the individual was qualified for and performed the duties outside the athletic department
for which the individual was compensated. The Division I members of the
NCAA voted in January 1991 to adopt the Restricted Earnings Coach Rule,
which became effective August 1, 1992.
The plaintiffs, who are or were employed as restricted earnings basketball
coaches at NCAA Division I institutions, brought this claim pursuant to section
one of the Sherman Antitrust Act. They alleged that the limit placed on the maximum compensation allowed under the Restricted Earnings Coach Rule was on
its face an impermissible restraint of trade and that the NCAA could demonstrate
no set of facts that would allow the restriction to pass muster under the Sherman
Act. The NCAA argued that the Restricted Eamings Coach Rule did not restrict
plaintiffs' potential compensation. The defendant further argued that, in any case,
the Restricted Eamings Coach Rule did not violate the Sherman Act because the
restriction was justified under the circumstances presented. The district court
granted summary judgment for plaintiffs.
LEGAL ANALYSIS

The issue before the court was whether the Restrictive Earnings Coach Rule
unreasonably restricted trade in a manner that was prohibited by section one of
the Sherman Antitrust Act. At the outset, the court noted that the material facts
of this case were undisputed. The court stated that the Restrictive Eamings
Coach Rule "speaks for itself," in that the parties did not dispute what it says on
its face or what it requires of member institutions and restricted eamings coaches
in practice.' Therefore, the court concluded that there was no material factual
dispute on the record. The court then moved directly to its analysis of the
parties' legal arguments.
As a threshold matter, the court determined that the Restricted Earnings
Coach Rule is an appropriate subject for examination under the Sherman Antitrust Act. First, the court noted that the Sherman Antitrust Act's protection
against price fixing extends to providers of labor or services as well as providers
of goods Also, the court noted that schemes to fix maximum compensation are

3. Law, 1995 WL 530123 at *3.
4. Law, 1995 WL 530123 at *4.
5. Roman v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 55 F.3d 542, 544 (10th Cir. 1995).
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equally subject to the Sherman Antitrust Act as schemes to fix other uniform
prices.6 Therefore, the court concluded that the maximum compensation mandated by the Restricted Earnings Coach Rule was clearly an appropriate subject
for examination under the Sherman Antitrust Act.
In beginning its analysis under the Sherman Antitrust Act, the court focused
on the per se rule for invalidation. Section one of the Sherman Antitrust Act provides that "[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with
The court recognized that almost
foreign nations, is declared to be illegal .......
any commercial contract could be covered under such a definition and noted that
the United States Supreme Court has held that only "unreasonable" restraints are
unlawful! The court then stated the per se rule for invalidating actions that conflict with section one of the Sherman Antitrust Act: "[slome activities, however,
are condemned as a matter of law, without inquiry into their reasonableness,
under an 'illegal per se' approach because the probability that such activities are
anticompetitive is so high."9 The court gave horizontal price fixing as an example of a practice condemned as a matter of law, without any inquiry into its
reasonableness.
However, the court rejected the application of the per se rule in the context of
this case. The court found NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma" especially influential. In Board of Regents, the Supreme Court rejected
the application of the per se rule and found that the NCAA was "an industry in
which horizontal restraints on competition are essential if the product is to be
available at all."" The Law court recognized that the integrity of the product of
collegiate athletics cannot be preserved except by mutual agreement. The court
then concluded that the NCAA is in a unique position in the marketplace for
college sports, and a fair evaluation of the competitive or anticompetitive character of the restraints requires consideration of the NCAA's justifications for adopting such restraints, hence the per se rule must be rejected.
The court continued its antitrust analysis by turning to the rule of reason.
Under this rule, "the true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such
as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is
such as may suppress or even destroy competition."' 2 Basically, the court determined that the test involves a balancing of all of the circumstances of the case to
determine whether the challenged restraint unreasonably restricts competitive
conditions. The court noted that there is no bright line separating rule of reason
from per se analysis.

6.
7.
8.
9.
1995).
10.
11.
12.

Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 347-48 (1982).
15 U.S.C. § 1.
Standard Oil Co. of N. J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60 (1911).
Law v. National Collegiate Athletic Association, 1995 WL 530123 at *5 (D. Kan. Aug. 2,
468 U.S. 85 (1984).
Id. at 101.
Board of Trade of City of Chicago v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
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The court then outlined the importance of the burden of proof under the rule
of reason analysis. Initially, the plaintiff bears the burden of showing that the
alleged agreement causes adverse, anticompetitive effects in the relevant market. 3 On a proper showing by the plaintiff, "the burden shifts to the defendant
to show that the challenged conduct promotes a sufficiently pro-competitive
objective."' 4 If the defendant is successful, the burden then shifts back to the
plaintiff to show that the restraint is not reasonably necessary to accomplish the
stated objective.'
With respect to tracking the shifting of the burden, the court adopted a "quick
look" rule of reason standard. This analysis applies "where per se condemnation
of a practice is inappropriate, but where no elaborate industry analysis is necessary to reveal the anticompetitive character of an inherently suspect restraint."' 6
Therefore, the court moved directly into an analysis of the defendant's proffered
competitive justifications for the restraint.
In applying the "quick look" rule of reason analysis, the court first examined
the NCAA's proffered effects of the Restricted Earnings Coach Rule. First, the
court rejected the NCAA's contention that the Restricted Earnings Coach Rule
has no anticompetitive effect because restricted earnings coaches may avoid the
restraining effect by obtaining coaching positions with non-NCAA teams or
obtaining employment not related to their coaching duties. Basically, the NCAA
argued that it had no market power, and thus, its restraint could have no adverse
competitive impact. The court summarily dismissed this argument by stating,
"[t]he absence of proof of market power does not foreclose a finding of
anticompetitive behavior under the Sherman Act."'7 It was not necessary for the
court to undertake an extensive market analysis to determine that the rule had an
anticompetitive effect on the market for coaching services, it was only necessary
that the court find that the Restricted Earnings Coach Rule prohibited the free
operation of a market responsive to demand and was, therefore, inconsistent with
the Sherman Act.'
Continuing its "quick look" analysis, the court next considered the NCAA's
contention that its regulation may be procompetitive because, if the NCAA does
not collapse as a result of its increasing costs, it will be able to continue providing the product of college basketball, and thus, there will continue to be jobs
available in the market for basketball coaches. However, the court rejected this
argument because the NCAA failed to offer any compelling evidence that its
member institutions were on the brink of financial disaster or that the reduction
in coaching salaries would "pull them back from the abyss."' 9 Further, the court
found that if the NCAA were allowed to justify this regulation on this ground,

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Law, 1995 WL 530123 at *7.
United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 669 (3d Cir. 1993).
Id.
NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 109 (1984).
Law, 1995 WL 530123 at *8.
Id.
Id. at *9.
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"they would almost always be able to do so by arguing that the restraint was designed to reduce their costs and thereby make them collectively more competitive
sellers."20
The next prong in the court's analysis was the NCAA's justifications for the
Restricted Earnings Coach Rule. First, the court stressed that the rule of reason
places on the NCAA a "heavy burden of establishing an affirmative defense
which competitively justifies" this infringement on the Sherman Act's protected
domain. 2 The NCAA attempted to carry this burden by emphasizing the importance of maintaining a level playing field in the sports arena, retaining and fostering the spirit of amateurism which is one of college athletics' defining characteristics, and protecting NCAA member institutions from self-imposed, ruinous
cost increases. This argument relied heavily on two past cases, Board of Regents
v. NCAA ("Oklahoma Board of Regents"),22 and Hennessey v. NCAA.' The
court discussed both of these cases and rejected the NCAA's asserted argument.
In Hennessey, the NCAA bylaw at issue was one in which the actual effects
could not be readily predicted because it had only been in existence for a month
at the time of litigation. The Hennessey court held that the good intentions of the
NCAA should fail to uphold the bylaw if later actual experience showed that the
bylaw did not effectuate those intentions. In distinguishing Hennessey, the Law
court stated that the Hennessey court placed undue emphasis on the NCAA's
stated good intentions. Although the court recognized that intent was relevant,
the court concluded that a good intention will not save an otherwise objectionable regulation. Further, the Law court noted that the bylaw at issue did not
require the court to wait to see the effects of the restriction. Therefore, the court
concluded that the bylaw was distinguishable from the one month bylaw in
Hennessey.
Next, the court discussed Oklahoma Board of Regents. In Oklahoma Board of

Regents, the Supreme Court rejected the Oklahoma Supreme Court's deference to
the NCAA membership's "avowed" purpose which was to maintain the principles of a level playing field and the spirit of amateurism through cutting costs,
and therefore, struck down an NCAA regulation placing a limitation on coaching
staffs.24 The Law court refused to adopt a presumption of reasonableness for
any NCAA regulation, asserting that any such presumption would not alter the
burden of proof. The Law court noted that the Supreme Court in Oklahoma
Board of Regents clarified the incorrect presumption of the Oklahoma Supreme
Court by stating that a facially anticompetitive measure carries "a heavy burden
of establishing an affirmative defense which competitively justifies [such an]
apparent deviation from the operations of a free market."' In Law, this "heavy
burden" was not satisfied by applying a presumption of validity to any NCAA

20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Id.
See NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 113 (1984).
561 P.2d 499 (Okla. 1977).
564 F.2d 1136 (5th Cir. 1977).
Boardof Regents, 468 U.S. at 85.
Id. at 113.
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bylaw.
Finally, the court rejected the NCAA's attempts to obtain leniency for its
restricted earnings salary cap by characterizing it as a noncommercial regulation.
The court concluded that the relationship between the Restricted Earnings Coach
Rule's salary cap and prices in the market for coaching services was direct,
substantial and demonstrable, especially given the NCAA's express purpose of
cutting costs by imposing a ceiling on salaries. Again, the court referred to the
Supreme Court case, Board of Regents.26 While Board of Regents agreed that
competitive balance is a legitimate objective for the NCAA in promulgating its
bylaws, the Supreme Court required that regulations with anticompetitive effects
be somehow related or tailored to the interests they purport to protect.
The Law court concluded that the NCAA had not demonstrated the necessary
link between its stated objectives and the Restricted Earnings Coach Rule. "Even
if an anticompetitive restraint is intended to achieve a legitimate objective, the
restraint only survives a rule of reason analysis if it is reasonably necessary to
achieve the legitimate objectives proffered by the defendant." z To determine if
a restraint is reasonably necessary, a court first examines whether the restraint
furthers the legitimate objectives, and then whether comparable benefits could be
achieved through substantially less restrictive means.29 In applying this test, the
court found that the NCAA failed to establish that the restraint furthered its
legitimate objectives. The court stated that the NCAA had not submitted any
evidence showing that by requiring schools to pay their fourth-ranked basketball
coaches all the same low salary, the playing field is leveled in any significant
way. Further, the bylaw did not limit how disparately the three most senior
coaches could be paid and made no mention of how the schools must spend the
money saved. Therefore, the NCAA bylaw failed the rule of reason and violated
section one of the Sherman Antitrust Act.
CONCLUSION

The district court held that NCAA bylaw 11.02.3, the "Restricted Earnings
Coach Rule," violated section one of the Sherman Antitrust Act. While a per se
rule of validity was not applicable in this case, a "quick look" rule of reason was
applied. Because the Restricted Earnings Coach Rule was a restraint of trade,
prohibited by the Sherman Antitrust Act, the NCAA bore a heavy burden to
establish that the restraint enhanced competition or, in other words, promoted a
legitimate goal. While the NCAA asserted many arguments in support of its
bylaw, the court held that the NCAA failed to carry its heavy burden and that
plaintiffs were entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Terry Schiff

26.
27.
28.
29.

468 U.S. 85 (1984).
Id. at 117-19.
United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 678-79 (3rd Cir. 1993).
Id. at 679.
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